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I. Introduction
In the film Groundhog Day,1 Bill Murray awakens on the
morning of the titular holiday to find himself forced to relive the
same day repeatedly. For Ted Wells, a veteran attorney who
defended Big Tobacco in the late 1990s, it may have felt like
Groundhog Day when Big Oil came calling with a similar problem.2
The downfall of Big Tobacco came at the hands of a cache of
industry internal documents, painstakingly revealed over decades
of litigation.3 These documents exposed a coordinated campaign of
disinformation aimed at clouding the scientific consensus that
smoking was harmful.4
Now, only a few years later, ExxonMobil finds themselves
under the same scrutiny. Only this time, something is different.
Leading the charge is New York Attorney General Eric
Schneiderman, who comes armed with a new investigative tool, the
Martin Act. This 1920s-era law, designed to combat securities
fraud, gives Schneiderman the power to subpoena mass amounts
of documents justified only by an ounce of suspicion.5 Thus, rather
1. GROUNDHOG DAY (Columbia Pictures 1993).
2. See Paul Barrett & Matthew Philips, Can ExxonMobil be Found Liable
for Misleading the Public on Climate Change?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept.
7, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-07/willexxonmobil-have-to-pay-for-misleading-the-public-on-climate-change
(last
visited Mar. 3, 2017) (noting that Ted Wells was leading the defense team for
Exxon, having previously defended Philip Morris) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
3. See infra Part II.B (detailing the history of tobacco litigation and the
development of tactics to expose internal documents).
4. See infra Part II.B.3 (explaining the misconduct exposed by internal
documents from the tobacco industry, which ultimately lead to judgment against
the companies under RICO).
5. See infra Part II.A.1 (setting out the powers of the New York Attorney
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than takings years of painstaking discovery as it did against Big
Tobacco, the coffers of ExxonMobil’s internal documents could be
opened instantly.6 Expectedly, outcries of criticism rang out, and
soon allegations of collusion, misconduct, and bad faith intent
rained down on Eric Schneiderman and his “activist” attorney
general colleagues.7
This Note examines the complexities of the ExxonMobil
investigations, seeking to understand how the investigation
unfolded over time and its motivating factors.8 To properly
understand the investigation, one must understand the basis of the
attorney general’s powers and assess whether those powers are
being used improperly. Further, this note seeks to survey the
potential consequences of action taken to curb Eric
Schneiderman’s aggressive tactics.9 Ultimately, this Note argues
that, despite potential risks, the unique circumstances of the
ExxonMobil investigation—combined with the rapidly changing
political landscape—indicate that moving forward with the
investigation is Eric Schneiderman’s ideal course of conduct.
Part II of this Note outlines the development, mechanics, and
past uses of both the Martin Act and tobacco litigation tactics by
“activist” attorneys general.10 Part III traces the origins of the
ExxonMobil investigation, and discusses the convergence of the
Martin Act and tobacco litigation tactics, along with the fallout
from Exxon’s counter-allegations of misconduct.11 Part IV assess
the potential consequences if critics of the Exxon investigation
attempt to reign in Eric Schneiderman’s conduct back to the
General under the Martin Act).
6. See infra Part II.B.2 (reviewing previous uses of the Martin Act to force
companies to open their internal documents to inspection by the attorney
general’s office).
7. See infra Part III.C. (covering the fervent criticisms of Eric
Schneiderman’s decision to commission an investigation into ExxonMobil under
the Martin Act, as well as his alleged ties to environmental activists).
8. See infra Part III.A (tracing the origins of the ExxonMobil investigation
and the conception of using attorney general subpoena power to gain access to
internal documents).
9. See infra Part IV (examining the risks Eric Schneiderman faces if he
continues to push his investigation forward despite criticisms and allegations of
misconduct).
10. Infra Part II.
11. Infra Part III.
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boundaries of acceptable attorney general activism.12 Finally, Part
V establishes the framework under which Eric Schneiderman’s
conduct can be justified, and argues that the his best course of
conduct is to continue forward, despite any consequences.13
II. The Development of Attorney General Activism: A Case Study
of Two Tactics
State attorneys general have a long history of taking an
activist stance toward issues of national policy and working
cooperatively to address these issues. Past examples include
litigation in antitrust14, consumer protection,15 and environmental
law.16 While some are critical of this “attorney general activism,”17
these attorneys general have gone more-or-less unchecked and
continue to engage in these tactics. But this raises questions as to
whether boundaries of acceptable “attorney general activism”
exist, and what the fallout might be if those boundaries are
crossed. For instance, are there limits on the extent attorneys
general may collaborate and form coalitions? Is it acceptable to
combine multiple “tools” or “tactics” for more efficient activism?
These are some of the questions surrounding Eric
Schneiderman’s investigation into ExxonMobil under the Martin
Act and its alleged tie to tobacco litigation tactics. Consequently,
12. Infra Part IV.
13. Infra Part V.
14. See Jason Lynch, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of State
Attorneys General in Multistate Litigation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1998, 2003–08
(2001) (detailing the rise of attorney general cooperation in multistate litigation).
15. See id. at 2007 (citing as an example a 1999 multistate action brought by
twenty-seven states against Publisher’s Clearing House for deceptive trade
practices in advertising).
16. See Lawrence G. Wasden & Brian Kane, Massachusetts v. EPA: A
Strategic and Jurisdictional Recipe for State Attorneys General in the Context of
Emission Accelerated Global Warming Solutions, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 703, 713 (2008)
(examining attorney general potential strategies in the wake of the states and
environmentalists’ victory in Massachusetts v. EPA).
17. See Michael DeBow, Restraining State Attorneys General, Curbing
Government Lawsuit Abuse, 437 POLICY ANALYSIS, May, 2002, at 1 (arguing that
attorneys general engage in “lawsuit abuse” which breaches the separation of
powers
in
state
government)
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/
pubs/pdf/pa437.pdf.
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understanding the development and mechanics of the Martin Act
and tobacco litigation tactics as tools for attorneys general is
crucial to exploring their roles as potential catalysts for violating
boundaries of acceptable attorneys general activism.
A. State Blue Sky Laws and New York’s Martin Act
Every state has adopted some form of securities law, often
referred to as “Blue Sky laws,”18 which are generally modeled on
the Uniform Securities Act.19 These laws provide for the
administration of a regulatory scheme by an established group of
commissioners.
1. The Attorney General’s Powers Under the Martin Act
New York’s regulatory framework, established under the
Martin Act,20 differs significantly from most state and federal
schemes in that it gives “vast investigatory and enforcement
powers” to the Attorney General.21 Indeed, the Martin Act is often
characterized as the most powerful securities law in the country.22
Specifically, the Martin Act empowers the attorney general to
investigate and prosecute any suspected securities fraud or
deceitful practices.23 Much of this power stems from New York
Court’s broad interpretation of “fraud” to include any “acts tending
18. See
Blue
Sky
Laws,
SEC.
&
EXCH.
COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/answers/bluesky.htm (last updated Oct. 14, 2014) (last
visited Mar. 3, 2017) (providing a brief definition of Blue Sky laws) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
19. UNIF. SEC. ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
20. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352(1) (McKinney 2013).
21. NINA HART, LEGAL TOOLS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE ADVOCACY: SECURITIES
LAW 10 (2015), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/
climate-change/ adaptationhandbook_securitieslaw.pdf.
22. See Nina Hart, Moving at a Glacial Pace: What Can State Attorneys Do
About SEC Inattention to Nondisclosure of Financially Material Risks Arising
From Climate Change?, 40 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 99, 107 (2015) (pointing to the
Martin Act’s broad definition of fraud as a reason for this characterization).
23. See People v. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N.Y. 33, 38–9 (1926)
(construing the Martin Act to condemn “all deceitful practices contrary to the
plain rules of common honesty”).
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to deceive or mislead the public,” regardless of a showing of intent
or scienter.24 Moreover, the attorney general may investigate any
suspected wrongdoing that an entity “shall have employed, or
employs, or is about to employ.”25 Thus, actual proof of such
fraudulent conduct or wrongdoing is not necessary to commence an
investigation.26 This broad discretionary power is further bolstered
by the plenary power of attorney general discretion, making
decisions of whether to investigate an entity not reviewable.27
The attorney general’s powers under the Martin Act are not
limited, however, to discretion in undertaking an investigation.
Once an investigation commences, the attorney general may issue
subpoenas for testimony, documents, and any other information
relevant or material to the investigation.28 An individual’s failure
to comply with these requests “without reasonable cause” results
in a misdemeanor.29 Because the state’s request for information is
investigatory in nature, witnesses subpoenaed for testimony are
not given the right to counsel or a right against selfincrimination.30 Additionally, while in most cases counsel may be
present, they are barred from objecting to questions, taking notes,
and receiving a transcript of the testimony.31 The entire process
may be carried on as a completely private matter, barring
24. People v. Cadplaz Sponsors, 69 Misc. 2d 417, 419 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972)
(enjoining a building developer from using an information bulletin containing
inaccurate information to solicit investors for a building project).
25. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352(1) (McKinney 2013).
26. See ANDREW LORIN, THE INVESTMENT PROTECTION BUREAU: AN OVERVIEW
OF FINANCIAL MARKETS REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT IN NEW YORK 5 (2006),
http://policydialogue.org/files/events/Lorin_investment_protection_bureu_1.pdf
(explaining that Martin Act proceedings differ from private litigation because no
proof of reasonable reliance or damages is required).
27. See People v. Bunge Corp., 250 N.E.2d 204, 206 (N.Y. 1969) (“We cannot
agree that the Legislature intended to grant the courts the authority to judicially
review the Attorney-General’s exercise of discretion in dealing with a Martin Act
violation.”).
28. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352(1) (McKinney 2013).
29. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352(4) (McKinney 2013).
30. See Lorin, supra note 26, at 8 (noting that attorneys are often surprised
to learn that because these proceedings are not adjudicative in nature, their client
does not have a right to counsel).
31. See id. at 9 (clarifying that testimony transcripts are only available once
the Attorney General’s investigation is complete and require a request under New
York’s Freedom of Information Law).

SMOKE ’EM IF YOU GOT ’EM

343

disclosure by any witness or state official at risk of a
misdemeanor.32
The attorney general may also conduct a public Martin Act
investigation.33 To proceed publicly, the Attorney General seeks an
order from the New York Supreme Court directing witnesses to
appear before the court or produce any information requested.34
The order may include an injunction to preserve the status quo
while the investigation proceeds if the court finds it proper or
expedient.35 Further, the attorney general may continue to
subpoena persons privately while a public investigation is active.36
The potential reputational and business damage of a public
criminal investigation makes the public Martin Act investigation
a powerful leverage tool for the attorney general, with significant
“shock value.”37
Additionally, while investigatory powers already incentivize
cooperation by investigation targets, these actors are further
incentivized by the risk that noncompliance could lead the attorney
general to institute a civil action against them.38 Civil actions
under the Martin Act carry additional consequences for
defendants, such as enjoinment by the attorney general if the
defendant is believed to be engaged in or is about to engage in any

32. See Frank C. Razzano, The Martin Act: An Overview, 1 J. BUS. & TECH.
L. 125, 128 (2006) (remarking that disclosure may be proper if given permission
by the Attorney General).
33. See id. (separating coverage of the Act’s investigative powers into public
and private investigations).
34. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 354, 355 (McKinney 2013).
35. See Abrams v. Long Beach Oceanfront Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 518 N.Y.S.2d
323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (denying a motion to vacate a Martin Act order and
injunction); see also Robert G. Morvillo & Robert J. Anello, White Collar Crime:
Securities, Investigations and Prosecutions Under the Martin Act, N.Y. L.J. (Mar.
31, 2003), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=900005383709/WhiteCollarCrime?%20&slreturn=20170010071551 (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (citing an
investigation by then-Attorney General Elliot Spitzer that obtained an injunction
against a brokerage firm) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
36. See Lorin, supra note 26, at 9 (pointing out that persons or entities not
named as respondents in the public § 354 proceedings may still be subpoenaed
privately).
37. See Morvillo & Anello, supra note 35 (describing the Martin Act public
investigation as giving the Attorney General “awesome power”).
38. See Razzano, supra note 32 at 131 (detailing the increased powers
available to the attorney general once a civil action has been commenced).
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practice declared to be fraudulent.39 Particularly, if the application
for a permanent injunction shows that the defendant has refused
“to answer a material question” or “to produce a book or paper
relevant to the inquiry” when ordered by the attorney general,
“such refusal shall be prima facie proof that such defendant is or
has been engaged in fraudulent practices . . . .”40 This potential
exposure greatly incentivizes any subject of a Martin Act
investigation to dutifully comply.
2. The Expansion of the Martin Act’s Role as a Tool of Activist
Enforcement
Originally passed in 1921, the Martin Act remained
underutilized for much of its early life.41 It was not until Elliot
Spitzer took office in 1999 that the attorney general’s office began
to use the Martin Act to aggressively investigate corporations.42
During his time in office, Spitzer pursued multiple Martin Act
investigations aimed at combatting fraud on Wall Street and
targeting the banking, hedge fund, and mutual fund industries.43
These investigations proved successful as he obtained large
settlements against several large financial institutions such as
Merrill Lynch.44 With the door of the Martin Act now ajar, Spitzer’s
39. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 353 (McKinney 2013).
40. Id.
41. See Hart, supra note 21 at 107 (noting that early use of the Martin Act
was reserved for “uranium boiler rooms and promoters of shady Canadian mining
stock” (quoting Nicholas Thompson, The Sword of Spitzer, LEGAL AFF. (May/June
2004),
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/May-June-2004/feature_thompson_
mayjun04.msp (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review))).
42. See Morvillo & Anello, supra note 35 (“Among the recent high-profile
uses of the Martin Act are Attorney General Spitzer’s investigation into whether
stock analysts were operating under conflicts of interest when they issued reports
on companies that were also clients of their firm’s investment banking
business . . . .”).
43. See Sarah Kelly-Kilgore, Ninety and Kicking? How New York’s Martin
Act is Only Getting Stronger with Age, AM. CRIM. L. REV. (Feb. 2, 2011),
http://www.americancriminallawreview.com/aclr-online/ninety-and-kicking-hownew-yorks-martin-act-only-getting-stronger-age/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2017)
(elaborating on the expanded use of the Martin Act under Attorney General
Spitzer) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
44. See Hart, supra note 41, at 107 (remarking that prior to Spitzer taking

SMOKE ’EM IF YOU GOT ’EM

345

successor, Andrew Cuomo, continued to undertake investigations
into the financial sector.45
In 2007, Attorney General Cuomo commenced an
unprecedented expansion of aggressive Martin Act use into a new
arena: energy.46 That fall, Cuomo issued Martin Act subpoenas to
five energy companies to determine whether these companies had
failed to include material information in their SEC disclosures
regarding risks related to climate change.47 The subpoenas sought
information regarding each companies’ “analyses of [their] climate
risks and disclosures of such risks to investors.”48 These
investigations coincided with Cuomo joining a group of investors
and environmental groups to petition the SEC for interpretive
guidance on information disclosures regarding financial risks
associated with climate change.49 Seeking clarification under
existing law, the petition expressed concern that there may be

office, it was an unspoken rule that the Martin Act would not be used against
Wall Street (citing Nicholas Thompson, The Sword of Spitzer, LEGAL AFF.
(May/June
2004),
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/May-June2004/feature_thompson_mayjun04.msp (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review))).
45. See Kate Kelly, Amir Efrati & Ruth Simon, State Subprime Probe Takes
a
New
Tack,
WALL
S T.
J.
(Jan.
31,
2008,
12:01
AM),
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB120173938230430417 (last updated Jan. 31,
2008) (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (reporting on investigations by Andrew Cuomo
into the subprime mortgage crisis) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
46. See Hart, supra note 41, at 131 (citing examples of Attorney General
Cuomo’s willingness to be an active participant in initiatives related to climate
change and the environment).
47. See Felicity Barringer & Danny Hakim, New York Subpoenas 5 Energy
Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/09/16/nyregion/16greenhouse.html?_r=0 (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (quoting
notices of the investigation sent to the companies as stating “[s]elective disclosure
of favorable information or omission of unfavorable information concerning
climate change is misleading”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
48. See Hart, supra note 41, at 106 (quoting Letter from N.Y. Office of Att’y
Gen. to Paul Hanrahan, President and CEO, AES Corp. Accompanying Subpoena
(Sept.
14,
2007),
http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/pressreleases/archived/aes%20corporation.pdf).
49. PETITION FOR INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE, File
No. 4-547 (Sept. 18, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2007/petn4547.pdf.
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widespread nondisclosure of material information relating to
climate change.50
The posture of Cuomo’s investigations is important for a
number of reasons. For one, each of the companies complied with
the investigations, presumably because of the Martin Act’s
penalties for noncompliance.51 After investigating the companies’
internal documents, the investigations ended with a settlement
agreement in which the company agreed to correct their SEC
disclosures and filing practices to account for climate change
information.52
Finally, Cuomo’s motive was more-or-less
straightforward—a concern with the extent of climate information
disclosures under SEC guideline—as the tandem petition for
guidance from the SEC shows.53 This at least shows a semblance
of the attorney general’s office willingness to work in concert with
the federal government.54 The characteristics that define Cuomo’s
investigations sketch a rough baseline of previously acceptable use
of the Martin Act in a climate context. Furthermore, this baseline
is a useful measuring stick when considering characterizations of
Eric Schneiderman’s later investigations as aggressive55 and the
product of ulterior motives, such as pursuing tobacco style
litigation tactics.56
50. See Hart supra note 41, at 104 (noting that the petition identified
growing awareness of financial risks posed by climate change, and potential
violations of selective disclosure law).
51. See supra notes 20–40 and accompanying text (discussing the potential
consequences of noncompliance with a Martin Act investigation).
52. See Informing Investors of Climate Risk: the Impact of Securities Law in
the Environmental Context, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10455, 10459–62
(2016) [hereinafter Informing Investors of Climate Risk] (summarizing each of the
settlement agreements and commenting on Cuomo’s actions).
53. See Hart, supra note 37, at 105–11 (explaining the interrelated timeline
of Cuomo’s Martin Act investigations and petitions to the SEC).
54. See Informing Investors of Climate Risk, supra note 52, at 10459
(commenting that the settlement agreements were focused solely on the adequacy
of disclosures in the SEC context).
55. See id. at 10460 (noting that a settlement brokered by Eric
Schneiderman against a coal company differed from Cuomo’s because it included
much more detailed public findings and actual allegations of violations of the
Martin Act).
56. See Brendan Nyhan, The Limits of the ‘Tobacco Strategy’ on Climate
Change, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/07/
upshot/the-limits-of-the-tobacco-strategy-on-climate-change.html (last visited
Mar. 3, 2017) (assessing the parallels and differences between Eric
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B. History of U.S. Tobacco Litigation and Plaintiff’s Tactics
1. Early Tobacco Litigation
In the mid-1950s, two research groups published scientific
studies that presented strong evidence linking cigarette smoking
to health hazards.57 With the publication of this evidence, a
grueling six-decade-long battle against tobacco companies began.58
Responding to these studies, the tobacco industry began to
implement a “sophisticated disinformation campaign designed to
deceive the public about hazards of smoking,”59 while also
conceiving litigation tactics to protect themselves in the courts.60
The defensive tactics focused heavily on burdening plaintiff’s
counsel through delay and evasiveness, while also driving up
litigation costs for plaintiff’s counsel.61 Tobacco companies
achieved much of this delay and obfuscation through resisting all
discovery attempts, which lead to extensive battles over motions,
court hearings, and protective orders.62
For much of the history of tobacco litigation, the tactics proved
to be fruitful and plaintiffs saw little success.63 The first “wave” of
Schneiderman’s investigation into Exxon Mobil and strategies previously used by
tobacco opponents) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
57. See generally E.L. Wynder & E.A. Graham, Experimental Production of
Carcinoma with Cigarette Tar, 13 CANCER RES. 855 (1953); R. Doll & A.B. Hill, A
Study of Aetiology of Carcinoma of the Lung, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 1271 (1952).
58. See Michael V. Ciresi, Roberta B. Walburn & Tara D. Sutton, Decades of
Deceit: Document Discovery in the Minnesota Tobacco Litigation, 25 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 477, 482 (1999) (tracing the beginnings of tobacco litigation
back to the 1950s).
59. SETH SHULMAN, CLIMATE ACCOUNTABILITY INST., ESTABLISHING
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGES: LESSONS FROM TOBACCO
CONTROL
5,
8
(2012),
http://www.climateaccountability.org/pdf/
Climate%20Accountability%20Rpt%20Oct12.pdf
[hereinafter
SHULMAN,
ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTABILITY].
60. See Ciresi, Walburn, & Sutton, supra note 58, at 480–82 (1999)
(providing in depth discussion of the history of tobacco litigation and tactics).
61. See id. at 481–82 (listing examples of delaying tactics, such as excessive
depositions and bombarding plaintiff’s counsel with massive amounts of useless
information).
62. See id. (remarking that even when discovery proceeded, tobacco company
counsel would pursue confidentiality orders to shield their disclosures).
63. See Arthur B. LeFrance, Tobacco Litigation: Smoke, Mirrors, and Public
Policy, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 187, 190 (2000) (“From 1954 to 1994, a period of forty
years, approximately 813 claims were filed by private citizens in tort actions in
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litigation against tobacco companies consisted mostly of personal
injury suits by individual smokers following the publication of
scientific studies in the 1950s.64 Faced with the tobacco companies’
defensive tactics—most notably stunting access to internal
documents—plaintiffs struggled to prove a causal linkage between
smoking and lung cancer.65 The second “wave” of tobacco litigation
began in the 1980s, which plaintiffs again brought as personal
injury suits.66 These cases struggled to achieve victory as the
tobacco industry shifted its collective argument to a “common
knowledge defense,” asserting that smoking hazards were a known
fact and smokers who continued smoking were engaged in
“freedom of choice.”67
Despite limited progress, the second era of cases did achieve
one noteworthy victory in the discovery process.68 In Cipollone v.
Liggett Group Inc.,69 the plaintiff succeeded on a pretrial motion
compelling the tobacco industry to release “thousands of pages of
confidential internal documents” that showed the existence of a
conspiracy to “prevent the release of damaging information on the
health hazards of cigarette smoking.”70 Although Cippollone and
its companion case Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc.71 were eventually
state court against tobacco companies. Only twice did courts find in favor of the
plaintiff . . . .”).
64. See Ciresi, Walburn & Sutton, supra note 58, at 482–86 (detailing the
results of early attempts to litigate against tobacco companies).
65. See id. (noting that in one such unsuccessful case, Latrigue v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963), access to R.J. Reynold’s
internal documents, which contained acknowledgement by company scientists
that data confirms a relationship between smoking and cancer, could have altered
the verdict in the trial).
66. See id. at 485 (pointing out that this wave of cases arose in the wake of
the surgeon general’s reports and the federally-mandated warning labels on
cigarettes).
67. Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44
STAN. L. REV. 853, 870 (1992).
68. See Ciresi, Walburn & Sutton, supra note 58, at 486–87 (“These
documents offered the first glimpse of the treasures that would be found in the
industry’s files.”).
69. 683 F. Supp. 1487 (D.N.J. 1998).
70. Christine Hatfield, The Privilege Doctrines—Are They Just Another
Discovery Tool Utilized by the Tobacco Industry to Conceal Damaging
Information?, 16 PACE L. REV. 525, 565 (1996).
71. 140 F.R.D. 681 (D.N.J. 1992).
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vacated on appeal,72 they served as the “first indications of the
extent of the role of tobacco company lawyers in shielding
documents from discovery on improper claims of privilege.”73 This
small discovery victory would prove to be influential on tactics
attorneys employed against the tobacco industry in later cases.74
2. Changing Strategy in Recent Tobacco Litigation
In 1994, new information regarding the tobacco industry’s
conduct came to light through hearings before the U.S. House of
Representatives and disclosures from the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration.75 Additionally, Merrell Williams, a paralegal for a
firm representing tobacco company Brown & Williamson, publicly
leaked reams of the company’s internal documents.76 In light of
these new findings, a third “wave” of litigation began.77 This string
of cases, however, differed significantly from past litigation
because it was not limited to individual claims; rather these cases
included states “seeking wide-scale injunctive relief and to recover
the costs to the state for medical care for injured smokers.”78 The
State of Minnesota—joined by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Minnesota and with Attorney General Hubert Humphrey’s
backing—filed a complaint against the tobacco industry,79 alleging
72. See Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 92–94 (3d Cir. 1992),
vacating 140 F.R.D. 681 (D.N.J. 1992) (finding that the District Court improperly
exercised its reconsideration function under the Federal Magistrate Act when it
considered evidence not originally before the magistrate judge).
73. Ciresi, Walburn & Sutton, supra note 58, at 487.
74. Infra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.
75. See Ciresi, Walburn & Sutton, supra note 58, at 488 (remarking that the
hearings were chaired by U.S. Representative Henry Waxman).
76. See id. at 487 (elaborating on the extent of the conduct exposed by the
“Merrell Williams Documents,” which showed manipulation of the scientific
record and promotion of a controversy over the linkage between smoking and
disease).
77. Supra notes 53–73 and accompanying text.
78. See Ciresi, Walburn & Sutton, supra note 58, at 487–88 (indicating that
this third wave of litigation also included large class action suits on behalf of
smokers).
79. See Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 491 (Minn. 1996)
(listing Philip Morris Incorporated, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corporation, B.A.T. Industries P.L.C., Lorillard Tobacco
Company, The American Tobacco Company, Liggett Group, Inc., the Council for
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a “50-year long conspiracy to defraud America about the hazards
of smoking, to stifle development of safer cigarettes, and to target
children as new customers.”80
Recognizing the tremendous value of internal industry
documents, the Minnesota legal team focused their tactics from the
start on using the legal discovery process to gain access to internal
documents and bring them to public light.81 The battle to obtain
these documents was unprecedented—the industry constantly
fought disclosure, which forced Minnesota to bring countless
motions to compel.82 Moreover, the industry undertook extensive
efforts to hide documents from discovery, such as “listing them
under different corporate entities, ‘laundering’ scientific
documents by passing them through attorneys in order to claim
attorney-client privilege, and playing word games in order to claim
they didn’t have any documents on the topics sought by plaintiff.”83
Minnesota’s arduous fight to pursue this strategy ultimately
compelled the disclosure of some thirty-five million pages of
internal industry documents.84 These documents were crucial to
advancing Minnesota’s claims and helped shift the focus of
litigation toward investigation into the industry’s conduct.85 After
Tobacco Research, and the Tobacco Institute as defendants).
80. Minnesota Litigation and Settlement, PUB. HEALTH L. CTR.
http://publichealthlawcenter.org/topics/tobacco-control/tobacco-controllitigation/minnesota-litigation-and-settlement (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also e.g., Ciresi, Walburn &
Sutton, supra note 58, at 487–88 (commenting that Blue Cross and Blue Shield
of Minnesota “was the first private payer of health care costs to sue the industry”).
81. See SHULMAN, ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 59, at 8
(explaining that Minnesota Attorney General Humphrey received criticism for
emphasizing the importance of obtaining internal documents during the
litigation).
82. See Ciresi, Walburn & Sutton, supra note 58, at 489–518 (detailing each
distinct battle between Minnesota and the cigarette industry through the
discovery process in Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490 (Minn.
1996)).
83. See SHULMAN, ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 59, at 8 (citing
a statement by one of the key litigators in Humphrey, Roberta Walburn, that
during pre-trial discovery, Philip Morris was spending around $1.2 million every
week in legal defense).
84. See Ciresi, Walburn & Sutton, supra note 58, at 489 (observing that prior
to the Minnesota litigation, only several million documents had been produced
industry wide, almost all after 1981).
85. See SHULMAN, ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 59, at 8 (“As
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a fifteen-week trial, the case settled before submission to the jury.86
Perhaps even more importantly, the release of documents exposed
the tobacco industry’s lies and deceitful practices to the public.87
With the public perception of the tobacco industry shifting, these
documents would become a crucial component of later actions
against the tobacco industry.
3. The Culmination of Tobacco Litigation: United States v. Philip
Morris USA Inc.
The release of documents in Humphrey v. Philip Morris, Inc.88
opened a massive record of information which exposed the tobacco
industry’s use of deceitful and manipulative practices over several
decades.89 From these facts, litigators could lay an evidentiary
foundation for charges of conspiracy or racketeering against the
tobacco industry.90 The potential to assert these charges came to
fruition in 1999, when the United States Department of Justice
filed suit against several tobacco companies for fraudulent and
unlawful conduct under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO).91 Relying heavily on the documents
Roberta Walburn explained, their legal team was able to say to the judge and
jury, ‘You don’t have to believe us or our experts; just look at the companies’ own
words.”).
86. See Minnesota Litigation and Settlement, supra note 80 (remarking that
the settlement still stands as the fourth largest legal settlement in history).
87. See SHULMAN, ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 59, at 9
(recognizing that the information gleaned from the document release became
front-page news).
88. 551 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. 1996).
89. See SHULMAN, ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 59, at 9
(“Formerly secret documents revealed that the heads of tobacco companies had
colluded on a disinformation strategy as early as 1953.”).
90. See id. at 9 (acknowledging the importance of these potential charges in
later tobacco litigation).
91. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2012). See United States v. Philip Morris (DOJ
Lawsuit), PUB. HEALTH L. CTR, http://publichealthlawcenter.org/topics/ tobaccocontrol/tobacco-control-litigation/united-states-v-philip-morris-doj-lawsuit (last
visited Mar. 3, 2017) (noting that the DOJ also sued for reimbursement of tobaccorelated medical expenses, however, these claims were dismissed) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) was passed by Congress in 1970 with the intent of
eradicating organized criminal activity and “preserve marketplace integrity by
investigating, controlling, and prosecuting persons who participate or conspire to
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obtained through the Minnesota litigation, the DOJ alleged that
the tobacco companies had:
engaged in a decades-long conspiracy to (1) mislead the public
about the risks of smoking, (2) mislead the public about the
danger of secondhand smoke; (3) misrepresent the
addictiveness of nicotine, (4) manipulate the nicotine delivery of
cigarettes, (5) deceptively market cigarettes characterized as
“light” or “low tar,” while knowing that those cigarettes were at
least as hazardous as full flavored cigarettes, (6) target the
youth market; and (7) not produce safer cigarettes.92

Following extensive litigation, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia issued a 1,683 page opinion finding Philip
Morris and other tobacco companies guilty of violating RICO by
fraudulently covering up the health risks associated with smoking
and marketing their products to children.93 The tobacco companies
filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit; after review, however, the three-judge panel
unanimously upheld the District Court’s decision.94 Reflecting on
what is viewed as monumental victory for tobacco control,
litigators involved in United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc.
continue to note the importance that internal documents played in
the outcome of the case, especially those obtained from the
Minnesota litigation.95
participate in racketeering.” Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). While generally associated with
combatting organized criminal operations, the law applies broadly to any habitual
criminal action that occurs in interstate commerce. See id. (citing to David R.
McCormack’s explanation that two or more acts of racketeering shown in a
complaint constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity necessary to attach
liability under RICO).
92. Id.
93. See United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 499 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.
2006) (“As set forth in these Final Proposed Findings of Fact, substantial evidence
establishes that Defendants have engaged in and executed—and continue to
engage in and execute—a massive 50-year scheme to defraud the public, including
consumers of cigarettes, in violation of RICO.”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 566
F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009), and order clarified, 778 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2011).
94. See United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (upholding the district court’s decision but vacating some of the additional
remedies sought).
95. See SHULMAN, ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 59, at 9
(referencing comments by Sharon Eubanks, one of the central litigator of the
case).
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Former tobacco litigators also recognize that obtaining these
internal documents through discovery is a long and arduous
process.96 As the litigation war against Big Tobacco continues, and
activist litigators consider new targets, its unsurprising that these
actors have considered ways to speed up the process.97 Just as state
attorneys general played a breakthrough role in the fight against
big tobacco, perhaps they could also play a role in “improving”
tobacco tactics through their subpoena powers under statues like
the Martin Act.98
III. “Oil is the New Tobacco:” Tracing the Origins of the
ExxonMobil Investigation
In January 2007, the Union of Concerned Scientists published
a sixty four page report documenting ExxonMobil’s alleged use of
disinformation tactics—similar to those used by the tobacco
industry—to mislead the public and create uncertainty
surrounding the science of climate change.99 Only five months
removed from the verdict in United States v. Philip Morris,100 the
report made substantial comparisons between ExxonMobil and Big
Tobacco, declaring that “ExxonMobil has underwritten the most
96. See Lincoln Caplan, Will the “Tobacco Strategy” Work Against Big Oil?,
NEW YORKER (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/willthe-tobacco-strategy-work-against-big-oil (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (pointing out
that the grueling effort and time that has been invested into tobacco litigation,
which is entering its seventh decade) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
97. See id. (commenting that a “fourth wave” of tobacco litigation has already
begun, even though third wave tobacco litigation cases are still ongoing).
98. See Part III.A (discussing how tobacco litigators and climate activists
conceived the idea of combining attorney general subpoena power with the
tobacco litigation goal of exposing industry internal documents).
99. See SETH SHULMAN, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SMOKE, MIRRORS
& HOT AIR: HOW EXXONMOBIL USES BIG TOBACCO’S TACTICS TO MANUFACTURE
UNCERTAINTY
ON
CLIMATE
SCIENCE
1–2
(2007),
http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/global_warmin
g/exxon_report.pdf [hereinafter SHULMAN, SMOKE, MIRRORS & HOT AIR]
(identifying the Union of Concerned Scientists as a Massachusetts-based nonprofit focused on environmental health that “combines independent scientific
research and citizen action to develop innovative, practical solutions and secure
responsible changes in government policy, corporate practices, and consumer
choices”).
100. 499 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006); supra Part II.C.2.

354

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 337 (2018)

sophisticated and successful disinformation campaign since Big
Tobacco misled the public about the incontrovertible scientific
evidence linking smoking to lung cancer and heart disease.”101
According to the report, ExxonMobil utilized its vast resources and
government access to promote scientific uncertainty, shift political
focus, and create doubt among the public.102 Specifically, the report
cited Exxon’s funneling of $16 million between 1998 and 2005 to
some forty think tanks and advocacy groups that raised doubts
about the scientific consensus that carbon dioxide and other heattrapping emissions cause global warming.103 Despite the negative
publicity that resulted from the report’s publication, any notion of
pursuing the fossil fuel industry as the next tobacco remained
mostly quiet.104
A. Conceiving the Possibilities of Tobacco Tactics and
Attorney General Powers
In 2012, these notions became more than a mere possibility.
In June 2012, scientists, academics, and lawyers descended on La
Jolla, California, for a workshop hosted by the Union of Concerned
Scientists together with the Climate Accountability Institute.105
Titled “The Workshop on Climate Accountability, Public Opinion,
and Legal Strategies” (“The La Jolla Conference”), the conference
sought to “compare the evolution of public attitudes and legal
strategies related to tobacco control with those related to
anthropogenic climate change.”106 The workshop focused on
assessing the question of holding private entities liable for the
effects of climate change.107
101. SHULMAN, SMOKE, MIRRORS, & HOT AIR, supra note 99, at 3.
102. See id. at 1 (contending that ExxonMobil adopted the tobacco tactic of
public supporting organizations which attempted to better understand climate
science to “cover” its funding of organizations that seek to confuse understanding).
103. See id. at 3 (asserting that many of these organizations have an
overlapping collection of staff, board members, and scientists).
104. See Barrett & Philips, supra note 2 (“The idea of ‘making oil the next
tobacco’ percolated quietly for several years and reemerged in June 2012 . . . .”).
105. SHULMAN, ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 59, at 3
(introducing the workshop generally before an in-depth discussion of its findings).
106. Id.
107. See id. (describing the general purpose for convening the La Jolla
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The results of the workshop were twofold. First, the
participants emphasized the importance of building a catalogue of
peer-reviewed research on individual corporation’s contributions
to climate change.108 This research would have present value in the
ongoing battle of public opinion while having future value as part
of the groundwork of liability in future legal action.109 Second, the
attendees concluded that while there are multiple strategies for
holding private entities liable, the key to altering public opinion
and laying the groundwork for eventual legal victory was obtaining
and publicizing internal corporate documents.110 Specifically, the
participants recognized the breakthrough role internal documents
played in tobacco litigation.111 Drawing parallels between the
tobacco and fossil fuel industries, “many participants suggested
that incriminating documents may exist that demonstrate
collusion among the major fossil fuel companies, trade
associations, and other industry sponsored groups.”112 Indeed, as
one participant remarked “the tobacco fight is now the climate
fight.” 113
The La Jolla conference was not focused solely on assessing
the potential of utilizing tobacco litigation strategies—it also
sought to improve these strategies. Recognizing discovery is a
lengthy process, lawyers present at the workshop emphasized

Conference).
108. See Elana Schor & Andrew Restuccia, Exxon Scrambles to Contain
Climate
Crusade,
POLITICO
(May
9,
2016,
5:28
AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/05/exxon-climate-campaign-222920
(last
visited Mar. 3, 2017) (identifying the La Jolla Conference as the conceiving event
of these tactics in a climate context) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
109. See id. (quoting Center for International Environmental Law president
Carroll Muffett as remarking that “[f]or a long time, fossil fuel companies have
benefitted from the idea that everyone is responsible for climate change—and if
everyone is responsible, then nobody is responsible”).
110. See SHULMAN, ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 59, at 11
(listing a variety of legal strategies, such as filing lawsuits under public nuisance
laws or claims of libel).
111. See id. at 7–10 (extensively discussing the development of tactics used to
expose tobacco companies, the timeline these tactics generally follow, and the
potential applicability of these tactics to climate change scenarios).
112. Id. at 9.
113. Id.
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alternative avenues to gain access to internal documents.114
Specifically, they noted that through a single sympathetic state
attorney general and her subpoena powers, there was potential to
gain significant access to documents.115 Despite the conference
facilitating these discussions and findings, it would still be years
before any major internal documents surfaced.116
B. The Exposure of ExxonMobil
These documents, however, did not surface from the work of a
prosecutor or congressman, but rather from work of journalists. In
September and October of 2015, InsideClimate News and the Los
Angeles Times published reports (“the reports”) claiming that
Exxon scientists had known about the implications of climate
change and its environmental effects as far back as the 1970s, and
further, that Exxon’s executives deliberately mislead the public
about these findings.117 Citing internal company documents, the
news organizations reported that despite company scientists
making findings regarding climate science, top Exxon executives
were publicly raising doubts about these same sorts of findings by
114. See id. at 11 (recognizing the potential of using congressional hearings
as a means of obtaining access to internal documents).
115. See id. (“In addition, lawyers at the workshop noted that even grand
juries convened by a district attorney could result in significant document
discovery.”).
116. See Barrett & Philips, supra note 104 (reporting on the timeline leading
up to ExxonMobil coming under scrutiny for climate change controversy).
117. See id. (noting that overlapping reports were released in the months
immediately leading up to international climate talks in Paris); see also Neela
Banerjee, Lisa Song & David Hasemyer, Exxon: The Road Not Taken, Part 1:
Exxon’s Own Research Confirmed Fossil Fuels’ Role in Global Warming Decades
Ago,
INSIDECLIMATE
NEWS
(Sept.
16,
2015),
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/15092015/Exxons-own-research-confirmedfossil-fuels-role-in-global-warming (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (covering four
decades of Exxon’s engagement with emerging climate science through internal
company documents, interviews with former employees, and other primary
sources) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Sara Jerving, Katie
Jennings, Masako Melissa Hirsch & Susanne Rust, What Exxon Knew About
Earth’s
Melting
Arctic,
L.A.
TIMES
(Oct.
9,
2015),
http://graphics.latimes.com/exxon-arctic/#about (last visited Mar. 3, 2017)
(reporting on the gap ExxonMobil’s public position regarding climate change and
its internal planning on issues of climate change) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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the 1990s.118 Additionally, the Los Angeles Times piece presented
evidence that, throughout the 1990s, Exxon relied on climate
change projections when it altered its Arctic exploration plans,
while publicly undermining and denying such projections.119
As expected, the reports “sparked waves of internet outrage,
some mainstream media moralizing, and the Twitter hashtag
#ExxonKnew.”120 Entering damage control mode, Exxon’s publicrelation’s staff began holding daily meetings to craft a response
plan to contain the issue.121 Before Exxon could properly begin to
respond, however, the momentum surrounding the controversy
began picking up steam. On October 14, 2015, Democratic
Representatives Ted Lieu and Mark DeSaulnier of California sent
a letter to U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch requesting the
Department of Justice investigate whether Exxon’s alleged
misinformation practices had violated federal law.122 The situation
was further amplified two weeks later, when 2016 Democratic
presidential candidate Hilary Clinton voiced her support for a
Justice Department investigation during a New Hampshire Town
Hall.123

118. See Banerjee, Song & Hasemyer, supra note 117 (quoting then-CEO and
Chairman of Exxon, Lee Raymond, arguing in 1997 against the Kyoto Protocols,
which were created as a step toward curbing emissions).
119. See Jerving, Jennings, Hirsch & Rust, supra note 117 (interviewing
former ExxonMobil scientists who studied the potential impact of climate change
on infrastructure and business prospecting in the Arctic).
120. Barrett & Philips, supra note 104.
121. See id. (quoting one Exxon public affairs executive as remarking “We all
sat around the table and said ‘This feels very orchestrated’ . . . .”).
122. See Reps Lieu, DeSaulnier Request Investigation Into Allegations of
ExxonMobil Deception on Climate Change, OFFICE OF UNITED STATES
REPRESENTATIVE TED LIEU (Oct. 16, 2015), https://lieu.house.gov/mediacenter/press-releases/reps-lieu-desaulnier-request-investigation-allegationsexxonmobil (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (remarking in the attached letter to U.S.
Attorney General Loretta Lynch that the actions allegedly taken by Exxon
resemble those used by Big Tobacco) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
123. See Timothy Cama, Hillary Joins Calls for Federal Probe of Exxon
Climate Change Research, THE HILL (Oct. 29, 2015, 4:22 PM),
http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/258589-clinton-joins-calls-forfederal-probe-of-exxon (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (citing a quote from Hilary
Clinton noting “[t]here’s a lot of evidence they [Exxon] misled people”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Shortly after Clinton’s comments, Exxon lobbyists descended
on the congressional offices of House Democrats, including
representative Lieu.124 During their visits, “[t]he lobbyists handed
out a 10-page presentation titled Managing Climate Change
Risks,” while conveying the message that Exxon “believes in
climate change and that its being caused by humans, and we
support a carbon tax.”125 Additionally, Exxon attempted to turn the
tables on its accusers by alleging the company was the target of a
politically motivated conspiracy.126 In a twist of irony, the company
pointed to the Rockefeller family—the same Rockefeller family
whose John D. Rockefeller founded Exxon forerunner Standard
Oil—as the orchestrator of the alleged conspiracy.127 Pointing to
funding the family’s charities provided to both the Los Angeles
Times and InsideClimate, Exxon attacked the role of the
Rockefellers in encouraging campaigns against it.128 While both
journalistic organizations were quick to respond that their donors
have no editorial control, Exxon and policy groups continued to
attack the perceived conflict of interest.129
Despite its attempts at damage control, the anti-Exxon sentiment
surrounding the controversy only intensified. On October 30, forty
environmental and social justice groups submitted a letter to
Attorney General Lynch demanding a racketeering probe into
Exxon’s alleged actions.130 Additionally, Representatives Lieu and
124. See Schor & Restuccia, supra note 108 (quoting multiple representatives
summarization of their meeting with Exxon representatives).
125. Barrett & Philips, supra note 104.
126. See John Schwartz, Exxon Mobil Accuses the Rockefellers of a Climate
Conspiracy,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
21,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/science/exxon-mobil-rockefellers-climatechange.html (last visited February 9, 2017) (reporting on the back-and-forth
accusations between Exxon and the alleged groups conspiring against them) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
127. See id. (quoting one Rockefeller descendant as acknowledging the
“obvious historical irony”).
128. See id. (pointing out that Rockefeller funds also provide support to other
organizations that have been critical of Exxon, such as Greenpeace).
129. See id. (“Breitbart News has called the investigation of Exxon a ‘RICO
conspiracy,’ using the acronym for the federal racketeering law, and the industryoriented site Natural Gas Now published an article declaring, ‘It’s time to RICO
the Rockefellers.’”).
130. See Barrett & Philips, supra note 104 (listing the Environmental Defense
Fund, Sierra Club, and Natural Resources Defense Council as some of the
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DeSaulnier approached the Securities and Exchange Commission
that same day, requesting a fraud probe against Exxon.131 It
became apparent that the tide against ExxonMobil was only rising,
when on November 4, 2015, New York Attorney General Eric
Schneiderman initiated an investigation to determine whether
Exxon Mobil had lied to the public or investors about the risks of
climate change.132 Relying on the Martin Act, Schneiderman
issued a subpoena demanding extensive internal financial records,
emails, and other documents from a period spanning nearly four
decades.133
C. The Convergence of Tobacco Litigation Strategy, the Martin
Act, and ExxonMobil
The use of the Martin Act to investigate a company in the
energy industry was not a novel or overly contentious endeavor
given past investigations under Andrew Cuomo.134 What was
novel, and ultimately gave rise to the storm of controversy that
merits this Note’s discussion, were the events that unfolded in the
months following Schneiderman’s investigation. On March 29,
2016, Attorney General Eric Schneiderman convened a press
conference to announce the formation of an “unprecedented
organizations that signed onto the letter).
131. See id. (noting that as of the writing of the article, that probe request was
still pending, and that Attorney General Lynch had since requested the FBI to
examine whether the federal government should initiate an investigation).
132. See Justin Gillis & Clifford Krauss, Exxon Mobil Investigated for Possible
Climate Change Lies by New York Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/science/new-york-climate-change-inquiryinto-exxon-adds-prosecutors.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (reporting that the
investigation is focused on statements the company made to investors about
climate risks) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
133. See Timothy Cama, Exxon Reveals Subpoena in New York Climate
Change
Case,
THE
HILL
(Oct.
24,
2016,
10:50
AM),
http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/302463-exxon-reveals-subpoena-innew-york-climate-change-case (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (noting some of the
documents demanded are related to research conducted by Exxon regarding the
causes and effects of global warming) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
134. See supra notes 45–56 and accompanying text (discussing former
Attorney General Andrew Cuomo’s investigations into energy companies under
the Martin Act).
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coalition” of top state law enforcement officials.135 The coalition,
comprised of seventeen Attorneys General and former Vice
President Al Gore, vowed to use its collective arsenal of
investigatory tools to aggressively defend and further build upon
the progress made by President Obama in combatting climate
change.136 This press conference signaled the “coming out party”
for a growing number of state attorneys general who had joined
Schneiderman in initiating investigations aimed at ExxonMobil,
claiming that the company may have misled the public and
investors about its own knowledge of climate change dangers.137
The announcement came at the end of a daylong event
Schneiderman organized to educate his fellow attorneys general on
his investigation into Exxon.138 As the comments from the other
attorneys general at the press conference showed, Exxon was
certainly on their minds in making the announcement.
Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healy, who issued her
own subpoena to Exxon shortly after, remarked that “fossil fuel
companies that deceived investors and consumers about the
dangers of climate change should be—must be—held
accountable.”139 “We can all see the troubling disconnect,” she
135. A.G. Schneiderman, Former Vice President Al Gore and a Coalition of
Attorneys General from Across the Country Announce Historic State-Based Effort
to Combat Climate Change, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. (Mar. 29,
2016),
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-former-vicepresident-al-gore-and-coalition-attorneys-general-across (last visited Mar. 3,
2017) [hereinafter Schneiderman Announcement] (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
136. See id. (quoting former Vice President Al Gore as declaring “Attorney
General and law enforcement officials around the country have long held a vital
role in ensuring that the progress we have made to solve the climate crisis is not
only protect, but advanced”).
137. John Schwartz, Exxon Mobil Climate Change Inquiry in New York Gains
Allies,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
3,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/science/new-york-climate-change-inquiryinto-exxon-adds-prosecutors.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) [hereinafter
Schwartz, Climate Change Inquiry Gains Allies] (reporting that attorneys general
from Vermont, Maryland, Massachusetts, Virginia, Connecticut and the Virgin
Islands attended) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
138. See Wade, infra note 159 (covering the events of the meeting and
referencing a statement by the New York Attorney General’s Office that the office
routinely collaborates with other states and receives input from outside
organizations).
139. Jeff Jacoby, Healey’s Exxon Investigation Runs Into the Bill of Rights,
BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 11, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion
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continued, “between what Exxon knew, what industry folks knew,
and what the company and industry chose to share with the
investors and with the American public.”140 The statements of
Schneiderman, Gore, and many of the other attorneys general
present echoed these sentiments.141 Notably, Al Gore went as far
as analogizing the coalition to the actions taken against tobacco
companies in the late 1990s.142
With the announcements by Massachusetts and the U.S.
Virgin Islands that they would join New York and California143
with parallel investigations into internal documents, Exxon’s
belief that a conspiracy was forming against them largely felt
confirmed.144 Expectedly, Exxon and its supporters publicly
rebuked the validity of the investigations.145 The critic’s rationales
were sweeping—ranging from allegations of a politically-

/editorials/2016/12/11/healey-exxon-investigation-runs-into-bill-rights/
2bUcNHtZjvbssO7YZIxFkJ/story.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
140. Id.
141. See Schneiderman Announcement, supra note 135 (quoting U.S. Virgin
Islands Attorney General Earl Walker as saying “If Exxon Mobil has tried to cloud
[the public’s] judgement, we are determined to hold the company accountable”).
142. See Schwartz, Climate Change Inquiry Gains Allies, supra note 137
(noting that Gore emphasized how crucial state attorneys general had been to
that effort).
143. California Attorney General Kamala Harris had launched her own probe
into ExxonMobil in January, prior to the New York press conference. See Ivan
Penn, California to Investigate Whether Exxon Mobil Lied About Climate Change
Risks, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/lafi-exxon-global-warming-20160120-story.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2017)
(reporting that U.S. Representative for California Ted Lieu praised the move) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
144. See Barrett & Philips, supra note 104 (“Exxon executives say their view
of #ExxonKnew as a conspiracy was confirmed by the gathering of 15 state
attorneys general and Gore in New York on March 29.”).
145. See Katie Brown, Greens’ Attempt to Tie Big Tobacco with American Oil:
An Absurd Apples-and-Snickers Bars Comparison, ENERGY IN DEPTH (June 22,
2016, 12:12 PM), https://energyindepth.org/national/greens-attempt-to-tie-bigtobacco-with-american-oil-an-absurd-apples-and-snickers-bars-comparison/ (last
visited Mar. 3, 2017) (sampling the criticisms leveled at the attorneys general and
the validity of their investigations) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review)
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motivated conspiracy146 to improper use of subpoena power147—
and even violation of the first amendment.148 Some legal scholars
expressed skepticism about the legal strategy of the attorneys
general, such as Vermont Law School professor Pat Parenteau’s
remark that “[t]he most serious question is whether the attorney
general has any basis to suspect that Exxon has engaged in
activities that violate that statues about obtaining money by false
pretense and fraud.”149 Additionally, Columbia Law School
146. See Marita Noon, May Free Speech Reign and Scientific Inquiry Prevail,
HEARTLAND INST. (July, 6, 2016), http://blog.heartland.org/2016/07/may-freespeech-reign-and-scientific-inquiry-prevail/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (remarking
that “climate change activists have been secretly coordinating with one another
to prosecute individuals, organizations, and companies that are their ideological
foes,” and that this coordination includes working with state attorneys general)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
147. See Philip Hamburger, A Climate Courtroom Crusade Scorches Due
Process, WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2016, 7:02 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/aclimate-courtroom-crusade-scorches-due-process-1463007726 (last visited Mar. 3,
2017) (criticizing attorneys’ general subpoena power as combining grand-jury and
prosecutorial functions, allowing attorneys general like Eric Schneiderman to
“engage in roving investigations” that threaten “liberty and due process”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
148. See Michael A. Carvin & Yaakov M. Roth, Op-Ed: AG’s Subpoenas Over
Climate Change Flout Constitution, NAT’L L. J. (Dec. 31, 2015),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202746113687/OpEd-AGs-Subpoenasover-Climate-Change-Flout-Constitution?slreturn=20170121204804 (last visited
Mar. 3, 2017) (arguing that the First Amendment protects actors who seek to
exercise their right to take positions in active policy debates and prevents the
government from punishing speech it disagrees with) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). But see John B. Williams, Peter J. Fontaine and Catherine
Reilly, Rebuttal: AG’s Pursuit of Oil Giants is Legally Sound, NAT’L L. J. (Jan. 25,
2016),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202747714889/Rebuttal-AGsPursuit-of-Oil-Giants-Is-Legally-Sound (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (responding to
the previous Op-Ed by arguing that the investigation does not target “falsity
alone, but also whether ExxonMobil made deliberately false or misleading
statements and/or omissions in order to mislead investors regarding the business
impact of climate change”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
149. See Bob Simison & David Hasemyer, Exxon Fights Subpoena in
Widening Climate Probe, Citing Violation of Its Constitutional Rights,
INSIDECLIMATE
NEWS
(Apr.
14,
2016),
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/13042016/exxon-virgin-islands-subpoenaclimate-change-investigation-violates-rights-claude-walker (last visited Mar. 3,
2017) (referring to the investigation commissioned by U.S. Virgin Islands
attorney general Claude Walker) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); see also Lincoln Caplan, Will the “Tobacco Strategy” Work Against Big
Oil?, NEW YORKER (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk/will-the-tobacco-strategy-work-against-big-oil (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (“Is
the ‘tobacco strategy’ the way to try to document that ExxonMobil fraudulently
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Professor Merritt B. Fox questioned whether the information
sought by the investigations would have been material enough to
investors to find that ExxonMobil’s public statements were
misleading under the Martin Act, given the market was “well
supplied with information about climate change.”150 In a laterpublished opinion piece, Professor Fox criticized Eric
Schneiderman’s subpoena as an abuse of his Martin Act powers,
considering the disconnect from possible securities violations and
the likely motive of seeking corporate documents for public policy
reasons.151
While Exxon and its supporters were voicing their
disapproval, other Exxon-backers immediately went on the
offensive.152 Specifically, the Energy & Environmental Legal
Institute (E&E Legal),153 which has been described as “an antienvironmentalist research machine,”154 obtained internal email
correspondence between the offices of the attorneys general
present at the New York conference.155 The emails revealed that
deceived the public about climate change and hold the giant energy company
accountable? It is a promising but hugely expensive and grueling model.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
150. See Securities Disclosures and Climate Change in View of Peabody and
ExxonMobil (panel discussion), COLUM. L. SCH. SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
L.
(May
25,
2016),
http://www.kaltura.com/index.php/
extwidget/preview/partner_id/1758691/uiconf_id/33931461/entry_id/0_xr29aj21/
embed/auto?&flashvars[streamerType]=auto (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (raising
suspicion over why Eric Schneiderman would pursue a case “so unlikely” to “be a
winner” during his remarks at a panel discussion) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
151. See Merritt B. Fox, Exxon Mobil is Being Investigated, but Here’s the Real
Problem, NAT’L L. J. (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/
id=1202765027711/Exxon-Mobil-is-Being-Investigated-But-Heres-the-RealProblem?slreturn=20160820150633 (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (positing that it’s
unlikely that the subpoena will turn up information that could plausibly support
an argument that ExxonMobil violated the Martin Act) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
152. See Schor & Restuccia, supra note 108 (listing examples of individuals
and groups that went on the offensive in support of Exxon).
153. See Who We Are, E&E LEGAL, https://eelegal.org/who-we-are/ (last visited
Mar. 3, 2017) (describing the group’s mission as seeking to “address and correct
erroneous federal and state government actions that negatively impact energy
and the environment”).
154. Schor & Restuccia, supra note 108.
155. See Christopher C. Horner, Email Bombshell: Attorneys General Worked
with Green Groups to Punish Political Opponents, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST.
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the
New
York
conference
included
two
undisclosed
presentations.156 The first presentation, on “the imperative of
taking action now against climate change,” was led by Peter
Frumhoff, director of science and policy for the Union of Concerned
Scientists, the same organization that published early reports on
Exxon’s alleged use of Big Tobacco tactics to create scientific
uncertainty, as well as organized the 2012 La Jolla Conference.157
“Climate change litigation” was the subject of the second
presentation, conducted by Matthew Pawa of Pawa Law Group,
P.C., who previously presented at the 2012 La Jolla Conference.158
Additionally, the emailed revealed that the attorneys general had
proposed the possibility of using RICO if Exxon was found to have
misled the public, as well as inviting former tobacco litigator
Sharon Eubanks to the conference.159 Given the connection to the
(Apr. 18, 2016), https://cei.org/content/email-bombshell-attorneys-generalworked-green-groups-punish-political-opponents (last visited Mar. 3, 2017)
(indicating the emails were obtained via an open records law request to the
Vermont state Attorney General’s office) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
156. See id. (referring to an agenda contained in one of the obtained emails,
which scheduled forty-five minute windows for each presentation).
157. Id.; see also supra notes 105–116 and accompanying text (discussing the
organization and goals of the 2012 La Jolla Conference).
158. Id.; see also supra notes 105–116 and accompanying text (focusing on the
Conference’s findings regarding tobacco litigation tactics and the potential to port
such tactics to other fields).
159. See Terry Wade, U.S. State Prosecutors Met With Climate Groups as
Exxon
Probes
Expanded,
REUTERS
(Apr.
15,
2016,
7:21
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-exxonmobil-states-idUSKCN0XC2U2
(last
visited Mar. 3, 2017) (summarizing the contents of the obtained emails) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The emails also included a “Common
Interest Agreement,” in which the signatories agreed to maintain confidentiality
and protect as privilege the discussions during the conference. See Horner supra
note 155 (criticizing the agreement as a sign the attorneys general sought to hide
their coordination). Critics attached the agreement as a sign that the attorneys
general sought to hide their discussions, a criticism bolstered by an email
exchange in which a member of Eric Schneiderman’s staff requested that Mr.
Pawa not confirm his attendance at the event if asked. See Katie Brown, New
Emails Reveal Attorneys General Signed Agreement to Keep #ExxonKnew Strategy
Documents Secret, ENERGY IN DEPTH (July 6, 2016, 4:04 PM),
https://energyindepth.org/national/new-emails-reveal-attorneys-general-signedagreement-to-keep-exxonknew-strategy-documents-secret/ (last visited Mar. 3,
2017) (quoting Schneiderman’s staff member’s response to Mr. Pawa, asking that
“if you speaker to the reporter, [do] not confirm that you attended or otherwise
discuss the event”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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La Jolla Conference, which had focused on assessing strategies for
legal action against the fossil fuel industry—including tactics to
obtain internal documents developed during tobacco litigation—
allegations of collusion and misconduct abounded.160
Despite efforts to beat back these allegations and criticism,161
Attorney General Schneiderman and his coalition soon found
themselves face-to-face with Exxon’s response.162 On April 13,
2016, ExxonMobil filed suit in Texas seeking to block the U.S.
Virgin Island’s subpoena on the grounds that it was an politically
motivated fishing expedition, which violated constitutional
amendments on free speech, unreasonable search and seizure, and
equal protection.163 Another suit followed in June, this time
160. See Margaret A. (Peggy) Little, The Climate Change Inquisition, Part
II—the Scandal Unfolds, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.fedsoc.org/blog/detail/the-climate-change-inquisition-part-iithe-scandal-unfolds
(last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (criticizing the attorneys general alleged collusion as
being commissioned in bad faith, outside of their powers, and in violation of the
Constitution) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Rich
Lowry, Eric Schneiderman and His Gang of AGs are Trampling the First
Amendment,
NAT’L
REV.
(Apr.
19,
2016
12:00
AM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/434219/exxon-climate-change-caseoutrageous (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (condemning the attorneys general for
flaunting their political motives and harassing Exxon’s first amendment rights)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
161. See John Schwartz, Exxon Mobil Fraud Inquiry Said to Focus More on
Future
Than
Past,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
19,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/20/science/exxon-mobil-fraud-inquiry-said-tofocus-more-on-future-than-past.html?_r=0 (last visited Mar. 3, 2017)
(interviewing Eric Schneiderman, who rebukes accusations that he is abusing his
prosecutorial powers for political ends) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
162. See Amy Harder, Devlin Barrett, & Bradley Olson, Exxon Fires Back in
Court Over U.S.’s Climate Probe, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14, 2016, 3:08 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/exxon-fires-back-at-climate-change-probe1460574535 (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (reporting on Exxon’s first challenge to the
state attorneys’ general investigations—filing in federal court to block the
subpoena issued by the attorney general of the U.S. Virgin Islands) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
163. See id. (citing arguments put forth in the complaint that the subpoena
was issued based on an ulterior motive). ExxonMobil’s complaint alleged seven
causes of action: conspiracy, violation of the company’s First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendment Rights, violation of the company’s rights under the
Dormant Commerce Clause, federal preemption, and abuse of process. See First
Amended Complaint, infra note 165, at 41–47 (seeking a declaratory judgment
that the subpoenas violate the causes of action alleged, and a permanent
injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the subpoenas).
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against Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey, and was
later amended that fall to include New York Attorney General Eric
Schneiderman.164 Citing the same claims of constitutional
violations as the U.S. Virgin Islands suit, the complaint
emphasized that the investigations were “an unlawful exercise of
government power to further political objectives.”165 As these
events unfolded in the courts, a Congressional response emerged
in July, when the House Science, Space and Technology Committee
issued subpoenas to the New York and Massachusetts attorneys
general and eight environmental organizations.166 Led by
Republican Chairman Lamar Smith of Texas, the committee
sought documents related to whether the attorneys’ general
investigations were the product of a coordinated strategy
encouraged by environmental groups.167
Ultimately, Attorney General Walker caved to the mounting
opposition, withdrawing the U.S. Virgin Island’s subpoena in
July.168 Healey and Schneiderman, however, have steadfastly
164. See David Hasemyer, 2016: Exxon vs. Climate Change, a Battle with
Many
Fronts,
INSIDECLIMATE
NEWS
(Dec.
28,
2016),
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/23122016/exxon-climate-changeinvestigation-attorneys-general (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (noting that
ExxonMobil had been complying with New York’s investigation up to the time of
filing, already producing over 1.2 million pages of documents) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
165. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5,
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Healey, No. 4:16-CV-469-K (N.D. Tex. 2016),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3217539/New-York-Sued-11-10.pdf
[hereinafter First Amended Complaint]. See also ExxonMobil Asks Federal Court
to Invalidate New York Attorney General’s Subpoena, EXXONMOBIL (Oct. 17, 2016,
10:51 AM), http://news.exxonmobil.com/press-release/exxonmobil-asks-federalcourt-invalidate-new-york-attorney-generals-subpoena (last visited Mar. 3, 2017)
(notifying the public through a press release that evidence of the attorneys’
general collaboration with activists shows a lack of impartial investigating) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
166. See Steve Mufson, Republicans Just Escalated the War Over ExxonMobil
and
Climate
Change,
WASH.
POST
(July
13,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/07/13/
republicans-just-escalated-the-war-over-exxonmobil-and-climate-change/?utm_
term=.9a88f54b991e (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (reporting the outcries from
environmental groups over the committee’s subpoenas) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
167. See id. (quoting committee member Darin LaHood, “[p]rosecutors
shouldn’t be in this business . . . . It really is an abuse of power”).
168. See Noon, supra note 146 (reporting on Attorney General Walker’s
decision to withdraw his subpoena, and quoiting ExxonMobil supporters who cite
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defended their acts and refused to cooperate with the
Representative Smith’s investigation.169 Additionally, both Healey
and Schneiderman have filed motions to dismiss in the
ExxonMobil lawsuit, but neither have been ruled on as of this
Note’s publication.170
In light of the backlash over Schneiderman’s investigation,
this Note recognizes that the perceived reemergence of tobacco
tactics, bolstered by use of the Martin Act, has struck a nerve in
the debate regarding increasing activism by state attorneys
general. And that if these actions are deemed to have crossed the
boundaries of acceptable use of attorney general powers, then
significant consequences may exist.
IV. Potential Consequences of Pushing the Boundaries of Attorney
General Activism
The question remains as to what are the possible consequences
if these investigations are found to be beyond the boundaries of
attorney general powers, and whether in the face of these
consequences, Eric Schneiderman should reevaluate the direction
of the investigation going forward. Given the uncertainty
regarding the outcomes of the court proceedings and
investigations, the assessment of these consequences is largely
hypothetical.171 This, however, does not detract from the
importance of assessing what could follow from attempts to curb
perceived attorneys general overreach. The relevance of this
question is highlighted by attorneys general confirming their
intent to continue being active agents for change,172 and opponents
this decision as a sign these investigations are groundless).
169. See Hasemyer, supra note 164 (providing a broad timeline of the multiple
investigations and lawsuits that unfolded over 2016).
170. See David Hasemyer, Exxon Ramps Up Free Speech Argument in
Fighting Climate Fraud Investigations, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Jan. 13, 2018),
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/13012018/exxon-climate-change-investorfraud-investigations-lawsuit-free-speech-new-york (last visited Mar. 27, 2018)
(summarizing the most recent procedural history of the ExxonMobil lawsuit) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
171. Infra note 220 and accompanying text.
172. See Vivian Yee, To Combat Trump, Democrats Ready a G.O.P. Tactic:
Lawsuits,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
14,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/12/14/nyregion/donald-trump-democrats-lawsuits.html (last visited Mar. 3,
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making clear their interest in curtailing attorneys’ general ability
to do so.173
It should first be noted that from a strictly legal standpoint,
Schneiderman’s opponents have essentially no basis to challenge
his conduct as improper under the Martin Act. As discussed above,
the Martin Act equips the attorney general with wide investigative
latitude.174 The broad definition of fraud that New York state and
federal courts endorse, coupled with the ability to commence an
investigation without proof of fraudulent conduct, essentially
provides a blank check to the attorney general to investigate any
perceived threat to the public interest.175 In the words of one court,
the Martin Act should “be liberally and sympathetically construed
in order that its beneficent purpose may, so far as possible, be
attained.”176 In the face of this sweeping mandate, it is unlikely
that any attempt to challenge an investigation as improper under
the Martin Act would survive.177 That is not to say, however, that
there are not alternative avenues to check the Schneiderman’s
conduct, as there are conceivable prudential-type checks.178
2017) (reporting that state attorneys general, including Eric Schneiderman, “have
vowed to use their power to check and balance Mr. Trump’s Washington”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
173. See Charlie Gasparino & Brian Schwartz, Trump Administration Looks
to
Neuter
NYS
‘Martin
Act’,
FOX
BUS.
(Nov.
15,
2016),
http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2016/11/15/trump-administration-looks-toneuter-nys-martin-act.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (pointing to discussions by
now-President Donald Trump’s transition team member Paul Atkins about ways
to preempt state securities laws with new legislation) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
174. See supra notes 20–37 and accompanying text (discussing the broad
investigatory powers of the attorney general under the Martin Act).
175. See, e.g., Bishop v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1557
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (endorsing a broad interpretation of fraud under the Martin Act
as including all deceitful practices contrary to the plain rules of common honesty);
People v. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N.Y. 33 (1926) (interpreting fraudulent
conduct to include all acts with the tendency to deceive or mislead, even if not
intended to be fraudulent by design).
176. People v. F.H. Smith Co., 243 N.Y.S. 446, 449 (N.Y. App. Div. 1930).
177. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (explaining that attorney
general investigative discretion is protected from review by the office’s plenary
power as the state’s sole law enforcement officer).
178. See Infra Part IV.A–B (discussing possible approaches that opponents of
Eric Schneiderman could take to limit his power without having to overcome the
broad grant of authority under the Martin Act).
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Specifically, federal preemption of the Martin Act and the potential
shift to heightened scrutiny of attorney general investigative
motive, could potentially reign in attorney general conduct.179
A. Martin Act Preemption
To begin, the unorthodox use of the Martin Act in concert with
tobacco litigation tactics could reignite the debate over whether the
Act is, or should be, preempted by federal securities law.180 In the
wake of the Martin Act’s resurgence under Elliott Spitzer, critics
of his perceived activism raised concerns about the overlapping
functions of the SEC and state Blue Sky laws like the Martin
Act.181 Writing in the New York Times, then-chairman of the
House Committee on Financial Services Michael Oxley remarked:
What we are witnessing is nothing less than a regulatory coup
that would usurp the proper role of the S.E.C. and the selfregulatory organizations. This could result in disastrous
balkanization of oversight, meaning that every Wall Street firm
would have to cut its private deal with every state attorney
general or face the potential threat of fraud charges.182

179. Infra Part IV.A–B.
180. “[T]he term ‘preemption’ refers to the displacement of state law by
federal states (or by courts seeking to fill gaps in federal states).” Caleb Nelson,
Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, n.3 (2000).
181. See Robert A. McTamaney, New York’s Martin Act: Expanding
Enforcement in an Era of Federal Securities Regulation, 18 WASH. LEGAL FOUND.
LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Feb., 2003, at 4 (noting that Congressman Michael Oxley
and then-Chairman of the SEC both had advocated for reigning in state activism
in securities regulation), http://www.wlf.org/upload/022803LBMctamaney.pdf.
182. Michael Oxley, Who Should Police The Financial Markets, N.Y. TIMES
(June 9, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/09/business/l-who-should-policethe-financial-markets-447650.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Representative Oxley was the co-author of the
landmark anti-corporate fraud Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, designed to restore
confidence in U.S. markets following the historic bankruptcies of Enron and
WorldCom. See Michael G. Oxley: In Memoriam, BAKER HOSTETLER,
https://www.bakerlaw.com/michaelgoxley (last visited Mar. 3, 2017), (“[SarbanesOxley], increased accountability and transparency in financial reporting,
strengthened corporate boards and governance, and created a new accounting
oversight board for public companies.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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Echoing these concerns over “balkanization,” Congress went so far
to propose an amendment to the Securities Fraud Deterrence and
Investor Restitution Act of 2003183 that would have preempted
state enforcement of disclosure requirements and “other yetunknown fraudulent practices.”184 The so-called “anti-Spitzer
amendment” was ultimately dropped from the bill, but its proposal
is evidence of the climate of concern surrounding state attorney
general activism through Blue Sky laws.185 Ultimately, the fervor
over Spitzer’s investigations fizzled, and the breadth of the Martin
Act continued to grow.186
With the Martin Act in the spotlight once again, and pundits
raising concerns for its scope and role, it is not inconceivable that
the conversation about preemption may return. Federal
preemption of state law can occur in three ways: express, field, and
conflict.187 “Express” preemption occurs when a federal law
includes language explicitly revoking specific powers from the
states.188 If the Court determines that a federal statute was
intended to cover an entire “field,” or is so broad that the “field” is
covered, then it state power may be “field” preempted.189 Lastly,
“conflict” preemption arises when the Court finds that a state law
“actually conflicts” with the federal law.190
183. Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2003, H.R.
2179, 108th Cong. (as introduced and referred to the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
May 21, 2003).
184. See Jonathan Mathiesen, Dr. Spitzlove or: How I Learned to Stop
Worrying and Love “Balkanization”, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 311, 325
(explaining that the amendment would have added “disclosure” and “conflict of
interest” to the catalog of state requirements preempted by the National
Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996).
185. See id. at 326 (describing further proposals of legislative preemption
from legal academia).
186. See supra notes 45–56 and accompanying text (covering previous New
York Attorney General Elliott Spitzer’s novel and expansive use of the Martin Act
after it had laid dormant for years).
187. See Nelson, supra note 180, at 226 (noting that this is the general
framework laid out by the United States Supreme Court).
188. See id. at 226–227 (describing the two-step framework the court uses to
assess an express preclusion provision).
189. See id. at 227 (“The Court has indicated that a federal regulatory scheme
may be ‘so pervasive’ as to imply ‘that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it.”).
190. See id. at 228 (stating that a conflict exists if compliance with both the
state and federal laws would be “physically impossible” or if the state law would
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The outrage over the Schneiderman investigations could push
multiple actors to challenge the Martin Act as preempted. The
most pertinent example is the Trump Administration, which has
adopted a stern stance of deregulation, especially in the securities
and financial sector.191 In the days following the election, one
report emerged that Paul Atkins, a member of the Trump
transition team, was considering “ways to ensure that federal
securities laws preempt state [Blue Sky] laws,” like the Martin Act,
by devising “legislation that would supersede them with existing
federal statutes.”192 While there has been no further comment on
this proposal in the early days of the administration, this report
alone was enough to elicit a fervent response from supporters of
state regulation, including Eric Schneiderman, who warned “any
attempt to gut these consumer and investor protections would
severely undercut state policy powers and only embolden those
who seek to defraud and exploit everyday Americans.”193
Additionally, some commentators have noted that an attempt to
preempt Blue Sky laws could be politically treacherous because of
risks of filibuster and negative publicity.194

be an obstacle to accomplishing the full purpose of the federal law).
191. See Sarah N. Lynch, Trump’s SEC Pick Clayton Points to Capital
Formation, Not Enforcement, REUTERS (Jan. 5, 2017, 3:52 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-sec-idUSKBN14N1Y9 (last visited
Mar. 3, 2017) (pointing to Donald Trump’s selection of Walter “Jay” Clayton to
head the SEC as a sign that the agency will focus on reducing regulations that
critics cite as burdensome on corporate growth) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
192. See Gasparino & Schwartz, supra note 173 (reporting that Atkins, a
former SEC commissioner, has “long advocated against state officials overstepping their authority through such statutes”).
193. See Statement by A.G. Schneiderman on Reports that the Presidential
Transition Team is Considering Ways to Dismantle State Consumer and Investor
Protection Statues, also Known as Blue Sky Laws, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GEN. (Nov. 17, 2016), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/statement-agschneiderman-reports-presidential-transition-team-considering-ways
(last
visited Mar. 3, 2017) [hereinafter Schneiderman Response to Trump] (“At a time
of regulatory uncertainty at the federal level, it is essential that we maintain that
very laws that have helped state and local law enforcement keep consumers and
investors safe for over one hundred years.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
194. See Gasparino & Schwartz, supra note 173 (quoting Columbia Law
School professor John Coffee, who also noted that “many Republicans believe in
state regulation”).
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While the feasibility of a move to expressly preempt the
Martin Act is beyond to scope of this Note, it should be noted that
critics have previously argued that, in fact, the Martin Act is
already preempted by federal law.195 Arising out of the
“Anti-Spitzer” sentiment of the early 2000s, one commentator
posited that federal legislation had established a comprehensive
regime that provided a solution to all manners of securities
regulation.196 Against this all-pervasive regime, the Martin Act
adversely affected the SEC’s ability to regulate comprehensively
and with uniformity as instructed by Congress.197 Thus, the Martin
Act would not survive under any theory of preemption, with the
exception of the “fraud” savings clause in the National Securities
Markets Improvements Act of 1996 (NSMIA).198 Under this
savings clause, states retained “jurisdiction . . . to investigation
and . . . enforcement actions with respect to fraud and deceit, or
unlawful conduction by a broker or dealer, in connection with
securities and securities transactions.”199 Although no case
emerged to test this theory, the commentator later argued that
even under the NSMIA savings clause, the “fraud” left to the states
to continue to regulate was “fraud” as defined by the federal
195. See McTamaney, New York’s Martin Act, supra note 181, at 4
(speculating on why the Martin Act has not already been found to be preempted
by the federal securities regime); see also Mathiesen, supra note 184, at 334–50
(arguing that the SEC possess the authority to administratively preempt the
Martin Act).
196. See Robert A. McTamaney, The Assured Guaranty Case & New York’s
Martin Act: Pre-Emption Delayed is Justice Denied, 29 WASH. LEGAL FOUND.
LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Mar., 2011, at 1 (pointing to the Securities Act of 1933,
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, National Markets Improvement
Act of 1996, Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act
of
2010
as
comprising
the
all-pervasive
federal
scheme),
http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounder/03-252011McTamaney_LegalBackgrounder.pdf.
197. See McTamaney, New York’s Martin Act, supra note 181, at 4 (predicting
that a case would come forward to test this theory, especially given Elliott
Spitzer’s expanded use of the Martin Act at the time).
198. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-290, §102(c)(1), 110 Stat. 3419–20 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §77r (2012)); see also
McTamaney, New York’s Martin Act, supra note 181, at 3 (arguing that this
savings clause served as a back door for Martin Act enforcement, despite belief
that the NSMIA stripped Blue Sky laws of most of their power).
199 National Securities Markets Improvement Act §102(c)(1), 110 Stat. at
3419–20.
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government.200 Because definition of fraud under the Martin Act is
far broader than the federal requirements—for instance omitting
the need for scienter—it follows that the Martin Act would fail to
meet the standard of fraud that the savings clause exception
preserved.201 Additionally, another observer has theorized that the
SEC has the authority to “administratively preempt” the Blue Sky
laws, even in light of the NSMIA savings clause.202
Although the theories proposed above have not been explicitly
proven, they make a reasonable case that preemption of the Martin
Act remains a possibility.203 Considering the fervent criticism of
Eric Schneiderman’s actions, combined with the deregulatory
stance of the Trump administration, this possibility of preemption
becomes a discernable consequence that could result from action
taken to restrict attorney’s general activism.204 For New York,
preemption of the Martin Act would strip the attorney general of a
valuable tool that places a significant role in policing securities
fraud, especially given the role securities play in the state
economy.205 Furthermore, preemption of Blue Sky laws nationwide
may have broader damaging effects, as empirical data has
suggested that concurrent state-federal enforcement of securities
fraud laws has some positive externalities which have the
potential to outweigh opposing costs.206 Thus, the risk of Martin
200. See McTamaney, The Assured Guaranty Case, supra note 196, at 2–3 (“If
[Congress] had intended to hand the states a blank check to regulate whatever
conduct the states wished to pursue, Congress, however unlikely, would have
simply said so.”).
201. See id. at 2 (asserting that if each state could define the breadth of the
NSMIA savings clause, then the “balkanized” regulation that preceded the
NSMIA would continue).
202. See Mathiesen, supra note 184, at 340–47 (examining the process by
which an agency may preempt a state law and noting citing examples of the
Supreme Court acknowledging an agency’s ability to do so).
203. See supra notes 196–201 and accompanying text (reviewing arguments
that the Martin Act is essentially already preempted, and that a single test case
is needed to prove it).
204. See supra notes 191–193 and accompanying text (looking into the
potential that the Trump administration may attempt to gut the Martin Act, and
the concerned response of Eric Schneiderman).
205. See Schneiderman Response to Trump, supra note 193 (“In the past few
years alone, multi-state fraud investigations into Wall Street’s role into the
collapse of the housing market have recovered over $95 billion in fines, penalties,
and most important, consumer relief.”).
206. See Amanda M. Rose, State Enforcement of National Policy: A Contextual
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Act preemption is a noteworthy consequence with far-reaching
effects that could follow from attempts to curb attorneys general
over-stepping their boundaries.
B. Increased Scrutiny of Attorney General Investigative Motive in
Multistate Actions
The second potential consequence that could follow in
response to the ExxonMobil investigation is a push to increase the
scrutiny of attorneys’ general investigative motive. The most
fervent criticisms of Eric Schneiderman and the ExxonMobil
investigation have centered on the belief that his investigation
under the Martin Act has an ulterior motive other than policing for
securities fraud. Indeed, the politically charged public statements,
perceived similarities to tobacco litigation tactics, and evidence of
cooperation with activists have all contributed to allegations that
the investigation was conceived in bad faith.207 This has led to calls
for reigning in alleged abuse of prosecutorial discretion
characterized by bad faith intent and improper political bias.208
But have these calls been answered?
For one, the House Science, Space and Technology Committee
(“The Committee”) investigation has specifically targeted the
attorney’s general investigative motive.209 In a letter sent to Eric
Schneiderman, the committee raised concerns that the
investigation constitutes a politically motivated attack on
Approach (with Evidence from the Securities Realm), 97 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1344–
52 (2013) (assessing rough empirical evidence of the costs and benefits of
concurrent state-federal regulation in the securities context, and advancing the
possibility that careful reform could help increase the overall efficiency of
securities fraud enforcement in the U.S.).
207. See supra notes 138–144 and accompanying text (sampling the various
criticism aimed at Eric Schneiderman, including questions of whether he really
is investigating securities fraud with the Martin Act).
208. See supra notes 142–145 and accompanying text (explaining that critics
and ExxonMobil have pointed to evidence of cooperation amongst attorneys
general and environmental activists as evidence of an ulterior political motive).
209. See Committee Scrutinizes Motives of “Green 20”, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
SCI., SPACE, & TECH. (May 18, 2016), https://science.house.gov/news/pressreleases/committee-scrutinizes-motive-green-20 (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (“The
Committee is concerned that these efforts to silence speech are based on political
theater rather than legal or scientific arguments, and that they run counter to an
attorney general’s duty . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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ExxonMobil’s free speech rights.210 Citing the evidence of
cooperation with environmental activists, the Committee
questioned “the impartiality and independence of current
investigations,” warning that coordination with interest groups
may rise to “an abuse of prosecutorial discretion.”211 Although
Schneiderman has refused to comply with the investigation thus
far, Committee Chairman Lamar Smith is not backing down
either, issuing subpoenas for records pertaining to the attorney’s
general investigative strategy.212
Echoing the concerns of both the Committee and critics in the
media, ExxonMobil’s lawsuit to block Eric Schneiderman’s
investigation is rife with allegations of an improper motive.213 As
discussed above, each of ExxonMobil’s foremost alleged causes of
action—violation of the company’s rights under the First, Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments—point to the same factual
information that has prompted backlash regarding the
investigation.214 For instance, the complaint alleges that the
politically charged public statements made by Schneiderman show
an improper political bias, violating the company’s Fourteenth
210. Cf. John Schwartz, Exxon Mobil Fights Back at State Inquiries into
Climate
Change
Research,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
16,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/17/science/exxon-mobil-fights-back-at-stateinquiries-into-climate-change-research.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (citing a
letter sent by a coalition of state attorneys general not involved in the “AGs for
Clean Power” coalition, which called the investigations “a grave mistake” that
“raises substantial First Amendment concerns”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
211. Letter from House Comm. on Sci., Space, and Tech. to Eric
Schneiderman,
Attorney
General
of
N.Y.
(May,
18,
2016),
https://science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/05.
18.16%20SST%20Letter%20to%20NY%20AG.pdf.
212. See Phil McKenna, State AGs Rally To Defend NY, Mass. Investigations
of Exxon From Lamar Smith Subpoenas, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Mar. 1, 2017),
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/01032017/exxon-climate-investigationlamar-smith-state-attorneys-general (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (reporting that
the Committee has also subpoenaed multiple environmental advocacy
organizations and the SEC, demanding documents related to any discussions with
attorneys general regarding ExxonMobil) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
213. See supra notes 161–165 and accompanying text (discussing the lawsuits
filed by ExxonMobil in response to the multiple investigations commissioned by
state attorneys general).
214. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (elaborating on the facts and
causes of action alleged in Exxon Mobil’s complain, as well as the relief sought).
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Amendment due process right to a disinterested prosecutor.215 The
complaint further argued that purported shifts in the focus of the
investigation show that the attorney general’s office did not bring
the investigation in good faith, as Schneiderman was searching for
a legal theory.216 Thus, because the investigation was brought in
bad faith, it constitutes “an abusive fishing expedition into 40
years of ExxonMobil’s records, without any legitimate basis for
believing that ExxonMobil violated New York Law,” which violates
the company’s Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures.217 While these claims must play out in court
before their validity can be judged, the allegations of improper
investigative motive have already struck a nerve with the court.218
Ruling on a jurisdictional issue before Eric Schneiderman was
joined in the case, the court ordered discovery of Massachusetts
Attorney General Maura Healey to investigate the court’s concern
that her investigation was brought in bad faith.219
The above examples illustrate the relevance of these concerns
regarding the investigative motive and intent of the ExxonMobil
investigations. At this point it is difficult to predict the conclusions
the Congressional investigation or ExxonMobil lawsuit will
yield.220 What is less difficult, however, is to imagine the
215. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 165, at 12–16, 44 (arguing that
the overt political nature of Schneiderman’s statements show he had already
made up his mind as to what the end result of the investigation would be).
216. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 165, at 30–31 (asserting that
after ExxonMobil complied with New York’s requests for information about its
climate change research, the investigation suddenly shifted to focus on
information about ExxonMobil’s oil reserves, under the theory that these reserves
had been overstated by not accounting for global climate change efforts).
217. First Amended Complaint, supra note 165, at 43–44.
218. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Healey, No. 4:16-CV-469-K, 2016 WL 6091249,
at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2016) (issuing an order and opinion directing that
jurisdictional discovery be conducted before the court reaches a decision on
ExxonMobil’s motion for a preliminary injunction or Attorney General Healey’s
motion to dismiss).
219. See id. at *2 (“The Court finds the allegations about Attorney General
Healey and the anticipatory nature of Attorney General Healey’s remarks about
the outcome of the Exxon investigation to be concerning to this court. The
foregoing allegations about Attorney General Healey, if true, may constitute bad
faith in issuing [the subpoena] . . . .”).
220. See Hasemyer, supra note 164 (reporting on the landscape of the
ExxonMobil investigations and accompanying proceedings, while acknowledging
that a long fight is still to come).
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conclusions that might be reached in the public forum. Since the
rise of the “activist” attorney general,221 there has been ongoing
debate over the need to restrain attorney’s general powers.222 This
includes arguments advocating for greater restrictions on attorney
general discretion to ensure that investigations are not brought
with improper intent.223 Concerns with attorney general intent are
even found in the American Bar Association’s most recent
standards for prosecutorial investigation, which states that
prosecutors must not “conduct an investigation for an improper
motive and thus the prosecutor should not allow personal or
political considerations to improperly influence decisions
regarding a criminal investigation.”224 As with the risk of
preemption, the nature of the ExxonMobil investigation could be
novel and alarming enough to propel the idea of greater scrutiny
of investigative intent from discussion to action.225 Whether
through the court proceedings already in motion, or through a
legislative response, a push for greater scrutiny of prosecutors is a
cognizable consequence that could follow from attempts to curb an
attorneys’ general power.
But are these consequences enough to deter Schneiderman
from continuing his investigation? He certainly has the option to
221. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text (providing a brief
summary of the early efforts by “activist” attorneys general).
222. See DeBow, supra note 17, at 1 (arguing the need for reforms that would
redefine the role of the state attorney general to curb the use of aggressive
litigation to shape public policy). But cf. Lynch, supra note 14, at 2000–02
(minimizing critic’s concerns that multistate litigation violates principles of
federalism and separation of powers).
223. See Ronald A. Cass, Power Failure: Prosecution, Power, and Problems,
16 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 29, 36 (2015) (“[J]udges might be
more skeptical of rules that broadly vouchsafe prosecutor’s discretion, whether in
facilitating inquiries before irreparable damage is done or in assuring more
searching scrutiny for legal assertions on which prosecutions—frequently in
connection with regulatory crimes—are based.”).
224. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS,
§ 1.2(d), cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
/publications/criminal_justice_standards/Pros_Investigations.authcheckdam.pdf.
These standards are not intended to give rise to a cause of action or be the basis
for civil liability, but rather to provide professional guidance to prosecutorial
officials. See id. § 1.01(b) (defining “prosecutor” to include any prosecutor or
attorney who serves as an attorney in a governmental criminal investigation).
225. See Cass, supra note 223, at 36 (advocating a year before the ExxonMobil
investigation that attorney general investigative intent needs greater scrutiny).
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claw back his investigation and continue down more traditional
activist attorney general routes, such as classic multistate
litigation226 or working in concert with the SEC to seek
disclosure.227 Yet if recent statements are any indication,
Schneiderman seems determined to power forward for now.228
This raises two questions: (1) are these risks not significant enough
to counsel against moving forward, and (2) do the circumstances of
this investigation suggest instead that moving forward is the best
possible outcome?
V. Framing Eric Schneiderman’s Ideal Path Forward in Light of
Potential Consequences
The answers to the above questions are implicit in framing
Eric Schneiderman’s ideal course of conduct going forward. Despite
potential risks, the unique circumstances of the ExxonMobil
investigation—combined with the rapidly changing political
landscape—indicate that moving forward with the investigation is
Eric Schneiderman’s ideal course of conduct. To begin, the broader
question that has carried throughout the discussion of this
investigation is simply “has Eric Schneiderman gone too far?”229
While instinctively it may appear the answer is yes, the above
discussion shows that from a purely legal standpoint, his actions
are within the powers granted by the Martin Act.230 Furthermore,
226. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text (providing an overview of
previously successful multistate litigation efforts led by attorneys general).
227. See supra notes 46–56 and accompanying text (explaining early use of
the Martin Act in the field of energy and how Elliot Spitzer worked in concert
with the SEC to seek guidance on disclosure). See also Hart, supra note 22
(advocating for Eric Schneiderman to use the Martin Act as a tool to encourage
the SEC to continue to update their disclosure requirements to better relate to
current understandings of climate change).
228. See Yee, supra note 172 (citing statements from Eric Schneiderman after
the election stating that he has already begun meeting with other attorneys
general about defending Obama’s clean-power plan from any Republican
challenge).
229. See supra notes 146–151 and accompanying text (discussing the varying
criticisms of the ExxonMobil investigation, including questions of whether it is
beyond Eric Schneiderman’s authority).
230. See supra notes 174–179 and accompanying text (explaining that the
broad grant of authority in the Martin Act makes it difficult to make any claim
that an investigation is outside of the attorney general’s discretion).
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although there are potential consequences for pushing the
boundaries of Martin Act use, none of these risks are one-hundred
percent guaranteed to occur.231 Because his conduct is not outright
improper, and there is no guaranteed consequences for his actions,
there seems to be little incentive to turn back, especially
considering how far into the investigation he already is.232
The rapidly shifting political landscape since the election of
Donald Trump, especially in the climate context, also counsels
against turning back. First, Donald Trump’s administration has
made clear their disdain for regulation, especially in regards to the
SEC and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).233 This is, of
course, tied to the Republican Party’s belief in the principles of
federalism: protecting state sovereignty from encroachments by
federal regulation.234 This interest in devolving power from the
federal government back to the states is best exemplified by the
penchant of Republican state attorneys general to sue the Obama
administration.235 Thus, as the Trump administration continues to
231. See supra Part IV.A–B (discussing the potential consequences that could
come from action taken to curb Eric Schneiderman’s conduct and noting that
there are drawbacks to each avenue of checking his power).
232. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (announcing that Attorney
General Schneiderman had joined Massachusetts Attorney General Maura
Healey in filing a countersuit in a Massachusetts federal court seeking to compel
Exxon to comply with the investigation).
233. See Juliet Eilperin & Brady Dennis, White House Eyes Plan to Cut EPA
Staff by One-Fifth, Eliminating Key Programs, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/03/01/
white-house-proposes-cutting-epa-staff-by-one-fifth-eliminating-key-programs/?
utm_term=.12d57e4d14b7 (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (noting that a White House
plan to cut EPA jobs reflects President Trump’s statements as a candidate that
he’d like to get rid of the EPA “in almost every form”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
234. See Republican Platform: Preamble, REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMMITTEE,
https://www.gop.com/platform/preamble/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (“This means
relieving the burden and expense of punishing government regulations. And this
means returning to the people and the states the control that belongs to them.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
235. See Terrence Henry, What Does the Texas Attorney General do for Fun?
“Sue the Obama Administration”, STATE IMPACT (Aug. 15, 2012),
https://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2012/08/15/what-does-the-texas-attorneygeneral-do-for-fun-sue-the-obama-administration/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2017)
(quoting then-Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott as stating “[w]hat I really do
for fun is I go into the office [and] I sue the Obama administration”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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cut back on federal involvement in certain policy issues, the states
are given more opportunity to regulate in those fields as they
choose.
This is especially apparent in the field of climate change, as
the Trump administration has made clear that this is a non-issue
to the administration and their intention to wash the federal
government’s hands of any involvement.236 With the federal
government potentially stepping back from climate change
entirely, this leaves a sort-of “vacuum” of policy regulation which,
by principles of federalism, should be filled by the states.237 Herein
lies the rub: Because Schneiderman’s actions are not outright
improper, there is a legitimate argument that policing this policy
issue falls within his discretion as attorney general. Republican
pundits may call foul, but the broad powers of the Martin Act and
the principles of federalism give Schneiderman a backstop to lean
on in justifying his actions.238 Furthermore, Schneiderman’s
discretion is not unchecked, as he is an elected official, subject to
the political process, and may lose power if the people of New York
reject his decisions.239
Therefore, if the federal government is going to wash its hands
of regulating in the field of climate change, the door is open to state
attorneys general to exercise their discretion police in that field as
they see fit. In this context, the broad powers of the Martin Act
make it difficult to affirmatively stamp Eric Schneiderman’s
actions as outright wrong, and the lack of guaranteed
consequences leaves little incentive to turn back on the
investigation. Thus, it is in Eric Schneiderman’s best interest to
continue his investigation despite these risks.

236. See Andrea Thompson, Climate and Energy Experts Speak Out on
Trump’s Views, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.scientific
american.com/article/climate-and-energy-experts-speak-out-on-trump-s-views/
(last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (reporting that Donald Trump has previously referred
to climate change as a hoax) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
237. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (“[T[he states and the people
retain authority over all unenumerated powers.”).
238. See supra notes 174–179 and accompanying text (noting that without a
strictly legal means of accusing Schneiderman’s conduct as improper, opponents
will struggle to make an outright case against such conduct).
239. See Lynch, supra note 14, at 2002 (“Today, state attorneys general are
independent executive officers popularly elected in forty-three states.”).
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VI. Conclusion
The ExxonMobil investigation has stretched the boundaries of
activist attorney general conduct far beyond their previous lines.
The combination of the Martin Act’s broad grant of powers, with
the connection to tobacco tactics and the politically charged subject
matter of climate change, make this a complex and polarizing
issue. Moreover, the country’s rapidly changing political landscape
makes it difficult to weigh these issues and consider the proper
boundaries for an activist attorney general. It remains apparent,
however, that Eric Schneiderman sees no boundaries, and has no
intention of backing down in the face of contentions that he has
gone too far.240
And why should he? Like his predecessors, Schneiderman has
pushed the door of the Martin Act, opening it farther than ever
before. Each time one of his predecessors pushed the door open,
they stood in the face of the backlash and continued forward,
stretching the boundaries of activist attorney general conduct to a
new norm. Sure, Schneiderman’s actions are the most novel and
extreme use of the Martin Act to date, and they may carry
consequences for the Martin Act’s future. But no reward comes
without risk, as Sharon Eubanks once quipped in response to
questions about the risk of losing RICO; “[i]f you have a statue, you
should use.”241 Allegations of misconduct may continue over
Schneiderman’s coordination with activist groups, but even his
opponent’s hands are not clean, as evidenced by a report that
former-Oklahoma attorney general and now-Administrator of the
EPA Scott Pruitt coordinated lawsuits against the EPA with major
oil and gas producers.242
240. See A.G. Schneiderman Leads Coalition of 23 AGs in Suit to Block Illegal
Rollback of Net Neutrality, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. (Feb. 22,
2018),
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-leads-coalition-23-agssuit-block-illegal-rollback-net-neutrality (last visited Mar. 27, 2018) (announcing
the formation of a similar coalition of state attorneys general that jointly filed a
lawsuit to block the repeal of net neutrality) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
241. SHULMAN, ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 59, at 14.
242. See Coral Davenport & Eric Lipton, The Pruitt Emails: E.P.A. Chief was
Arm
in
Arm
with
Industry,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
22,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/us/politics/scott-pruitt-environmentalprotection-agency.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (noting that oil and gas
industry executives held secret meetings with Pruitt to coordinate ways to combat
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In 2016, the country saw Donald Trump redefine what it
means to be a political candidate. In 2017, we watched as he
pushed our definition of what it means to be president. Perhaps
2018 is the year that Eric Schneiderman pushes our
understanding of the state attorney general’s role as an agent of
change. The “activist” attorney general will always be a polarizing
and controversial figure, but the shifting tides of the United States’
political and enforcement regime may lead us to rethink the
boundaries of their ability to be agents of change.

the Obama administration’s environmental agenda) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).

